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Abstract
We consider a repeated duopoly game where each ﬁrm privately chooses
its investment in quality, and realized quality is a noisy indicator of the
ﬁrm’s investment. We focus on dynamic reputation equilibria, whereby
consumers ‘discipline’ a ﬁr mb ys w i t c h i n gt oi t sr i v a li nt h ec a s et h a t
the realized quality of its product is too low. This type of equilibrium is
characterized by consumers’ tolerance level - the level of product quality
below which consumers switch to the rival ﬁrm - and ﬁrms’ investment in
quality. Given consumers’ tolerance level, we determine when a dynamic
equilibrium that gives higher welfare than the static equilibrium exists.
We also derive comparative statics properties, and characterize a set of
investment levels and, hence, payoﬀs that our equilibria sustain.
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11 Introduction
This paper studies markets in which the quality of a product or a service varies
over time, and in which consumers’ expectations about future quality are deter-
mined by past quality. Firms in such markets are subjected to turnover; a ﬁrm
that suﬀers a low quality realization loses favor in the eyes of consumers and,
as a result, loses market share and proﬁts. Our objective here is to set up and
analyze a model focusing on this turnover phenomenon.
The point of view we take is that the presence of turnover disciplines ﬁrms
in a world of moral hazard. Consider a world in which the quality of a ﬁrm’s
product is inﬂuenced by its investments, and in which these investments are
private information. Assume also that consumers cannot ascertain quality at
the point of purchase and that the legal system does not provide an eﬀective
and/or timely protection. Then, the equilibrium quality of products is prone
to be minimal and, in particular, below the quality that is socially optimal. If
consumers buy the product repeatedly, however, then the option to turn their
business over to other ﬁrms has the potential to rectify this problem. Indeed,
in such circumstances, a ﬁrm invests in quality because the delivery of high
quality today generates high demand and high proﬁts tomorrow, whereas the
delivery of low quality results in low demand and low proﬁts. Our purpose here
is to make precise this intuition and study it systematically in the context of an
oligopoly.
This line of research relates to two strands of literature. The ﬁrst strand is
the IO literature that originated with Klein and Leﬄer (1981), where the disci-
plinary role of markets was ﬁrst recognized (see also Shapiro (1983)). Compared
to this literature we make explicit the phenomenon of turnover. A ﬁrm’s price,
volume of sales, and stock market valuation all ﬂuctuate over time because of
the noise in quality, and these ﬂuctuations are endogenous to the model. We
also oﬀer a uniﬁed and systematic analysis of a variety of duopoly games, in-
cluding some of the most traditional games encountered in the IO literature.
This allows us to link details of the competitive interaction between ﬁrms (mar-
ket size, cost of investing in quality, degree of product diﬀerentiation, the noisy
connection between investments and realized quality, etc.) and the nature of
turnover equilibria.
A second strand of relevant literature is that on repeated games with imper-
fect monitoring, found in papers such as Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994).
This literature shows the full potential of repeated interaction to sustain out-
comes that are unsustainable under one-shot interaction, and allows general
(and arbitrarily complex) strategies to achieve that. Compared with this latter
literature we concentrate on particular, simple strategies that are in the spirit
of the IO literature. Then we characterize equilibria via standard marginal con-
ditions, and use familiar ﬁxed point arguments to prove their existence. Using
this tractable approach we perform various comparative statics and quantitative
exercises, and study welfare properties.
2In greater detail, the turnover mechanism we study is characterized by a
threshold realized quality level that we call consumers’ tolerance level.I faﬁrm
delivers this, or higher, quality level, consumers believe that this ﬁrm is likely to
deliver high quality in the future; otherwise, consumers believe that the ﬁrm is
likely to deliver low quality. We embed this belief into a dynamic duopoly model
in which ﬁrms and consumers are strategic players. Firms invest in quality and
consumers form beliefs about future investments, based on last period’s realized
quality, and these beliefs determine consumers’ purchasing behavior. Using this
framework we derive three sets of the results.
The ﬁrst set of results deals with existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium
of the type described above. Given some tolerance level, we derive a closed form
expression, written in terms of model primitives, which characterizes a set of
investment levels that constitute equilibria. This allows us to pin down a con-
dition under which positive investments are sustainable in equilibrium, so that
some dynamic equilibrium is better than the static equilibrium that would occur
without repeated purchase. The condition we state relates to the cost of quality
provision (requiring it to be suﬃciently low), although, as we comment, anal-
ogous condition can be stated relating to consumers’ demand curve (requiring
it to be suﬃciently high). Hence, the question whether a dynamic equilibrium
under repeated purchase improves upon the static equilibrium is settled by di-
rect reference to model primitives. We also derive a condition under which the
equilibrium (with positive investments) is unique for a given tolerance level.
This condition, too, relates to model primitives.
The second set of results deals with comparative static properties of the
equilibrium which is characterized by the largest investment level among all
equilibria. Here we again take advantage of the simple characterization of the
equilibrium set, and show that the ‘largest’ equilibrium is increasing with the
discount factor. We also show that the largest equilibrium may increase or
decrease in consumers’ tolerance level, depending on properties of the noise dis-
tribution, and we elicit suﬃcient conditions under which one or the other occurs.
Our analysis here is related to recent literature on monotone comparative stat-
ics (see Milgrom and Roberts (1990)) and, more speciﬁcally, to the property
that a ﬁrm’s best response curve shifts uniformly upwards or downwards when
certain parameters change. As such our approach is easily extendable to other
parametric changes, for instance, relating to cost or demand conditions.
The third set of results deals with welfare properties of the model. We
delineate a set of investment levels and, thereby, a set of welfare levels that are
sustainable via turnover equilibria if ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient. Our analysis
indicates that noisy observation of investments constrains the set of welfare
levels that one can sustain via turnover equilibria. Finally, we show that a
simple generalization of the turnover mechanism can do no better in terms of
welfare.
Many of our results are illustrated numerically, using three parametric exam-
ples. Among other things, we illustrate the nature of ﬂuctuations that turnover
3equilibria induce, which includes the duration of selling high and low quality
products, period proﬁts and stock market valuations. We also show how to
numerically determine parameter values under which the best constrained equi-
librium is achieved.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is divided into
three subsections. In the ﬁrst subsection we set up a generally speciﬁed period
game that is played in each period. In the second subsection we outline three IO-
type examples that are special cases of the period game. In the third subsection
we show how the period game is embedded into an inﬁnitely repeated game.
Section 3 introduces the concepts of tolerance level and turnover equilibria,
and analyzes a ﬁrm’s problem when consumers’ belief is based on a tolerance
level. Section 4 is divided into two parts. In the ﬁr s tp a r tw ep r o v ee x i s t e n c ea n d
uniqueness of turnover equilibria, given consumers’ tolerance level. In the second
part the results are numerically illustrated. Section 5 studies comparative statics
properties of the model, which includes sensitivity of equilibria with respect to
the discount factor and consumers’ tolerance level. Section 6 characterizes a set
of welfare levels that are sustained via turnover equilibria with patient ﬁrms, and
shows that one can do no better via what we call tournament equilibria, which
are, essentially, a generalization of turnover equilibria. Section 7 concludes with
further discussion of related literature and suggestions for future work.
2 The Model
We consider an inﬁnite horizon model in discrete time, and index time periods
by t =1 ,2,···. There are two identical, risk-neutral ﬁrms who produce and
sell to a continuum of price taking, risk-neutral consumers. Firms are indexed
by i,j =1 ,2 and play a two-stage game within each period. The game is as
follows.
2.1 The Period Game
In the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms move simultaneously, choosing their investments,w h i c h
determine the average quality of their products. We let xi ≥ 0d e n o t eﬁrm i’s
investment and x denote either ﬁrm’s investment. The cost of choosing x is
c(x). We assume c(0) = c0(0) = 0, c0(x) > 0a n dc00(x) > 0 for all x>0, and
c0(∞)=∞. x is a ﬁxed cost: it aﬀects the quality of all units a ﬁrm sells and
is independent of the number of these units. We assume that xi is privately
chosen by ﬁrm i and is unobservable to ﬁrm j or to any consumer. We let yi
denote consumers’ and ﬁrm j’s belief about xi. We discuss later how yi’s are
determined.
In the second stage ﬁrms move simultaneously again, choosing either the
quantity they sell or the price they charge (but not both). Since the formulation
encompasses both possibilities we refer to quantity or price generically as an
action.W el e tzi ≥ 0d e n o t eﬁrm i’s action and z denote either ﬁrm’s action.
4Then, depending on the choice of actions, the market clears and ﬁrms’ period
proﬁts are determined. The way the market clears depends on (z1,z 2)a n d
(y1,y 2) but not on (x1,x 2), which is not publicly observed, and has no eﬀect
on ﬁrms’ period payoﬀsg r o s so fc(xi) (which has already been sunk). We let
ui(z1,z 2;y1,y 2)d e n o t eﬁrm i’s gross period payoﬀ,w h e nﬁrms’ action proﬁle
is (z1,z 2) and when they are believed to have chosen (y1,y 2). These ui’s are
symmetric, i.e.,
u1(z1,z 2;y1,y 2)=u2(z2,z 1;y2,y 1).
Once the market clears and consumers consume the products, the quality of
these products is realized. The realized quality of all units that a ﬁrm sells (if at
all) is the same and is publicly observed.1 We assume that if ﬁrm i’s investment
is xi, then the realized quality of its products qi is
qi = xi + ²i,
where ²i is a noise term. We denote the joint c.d.f. of (²1,² 2)b yG(²1,² 2). G
has a full support on (−∞,∞) × (−∞,∞), a (0,0) mean, and is symmetric,
G(²,²0)=G(²0,²). Hence the marginal c.d.f. of ²1 is same as that of ²2.W e
denote it by F(²), f(²) being its p.d.f. We assume that F is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, and that for any ²>0, f0(−²) > 0 >f 0(²), so that f is hump-
shaped with a single peak at ² =0 . 2 Since qi has a full support (−∞,∞)
under any feasible investment proﬁl e ,i tc a n n o ts e r v ea sas u r es i g n a lt h a tﬁrm
i deviated from some (in fact any) investment level.
For a ﬁxed (y1,y 2), the proﬁt functions, ui(z1,z 2;y1,y 2)f o ri =1 ,2, deter-
mine a static game in which ﬁrms compete in zi’s. Let us denote this game by
Γ(y1,y 2), and let us make the following assumptions about its equilibria. We
later exhibit three standard models of duopoly, where these assumptions are
satisﬁed.




(ii) For i =1 ,2,l e t
πi(y1,y 2) ≡ ui(z∗
1(y1,y 2),z∗
2(y1,y 2);y1,y 2).
Then πi(y1,y 2)’s are continuous in (y1,y 2).
(iii) Let
∆(x) ≡ π1(x,0) − c(x) − π1(0,x).
1If a ﬁrm does not sell anything, we set the realized quality of its products to be zero.
This speciﬁcation is for the sake of concreteness, and our results are independent of how this
quality is speciﬁed.
2One special case here is when ²1 and ²2 are independent of each other, and have the same
density function, f.
5Then ∆0(0) > 0 and there exists an x<∞ so that
{x|∆(x) > 0} =( 0 ,x).
We rule out collusion between ﬁrms in terms of the actions (z1,z 2). There-
fore, Assumption 1(i) says that once a belief is ﬁxed at (y1,y 2), the only rational
behavior for ﬁrms to follow is (z∗
1(y1,y 2),z∗
2(y1,y 2)). Assumption 1(ii) says that
equilibrium payoﬀs are continuous in beliefs. Assumption 1(iii) concerns the
proﬁtd i ﬀerential ∆ between one of the ﬁrms that we label the “high quality
ﬁrm” (or HQ) and that chooses a positive investment, and the other ﬁrm that
we label the “low quality ﬁrm” (or LQ) and that chooses zero investment. Then,
Assumption 1(iii) says that the HQ ﬁrm gets a higher net period proﬁt( t h a n
the LQ ﬁrm) as long as its investment is positive, but not too high. If the in-
vestment of HQ is too high, the cost of this investment overwhelms the quality
advantage it gives rise to, so HQ ends up with lower proﬁts. While 1(iii) is
written from ﬁrm 1’s viewpoint, by symmetry, it also holds for ﬁrm 2.
If ﬁrms choose (x1,x 2) and if beliefs are correct, (y1,y 2)=( x1,x 2), then the
equilibrium play in the second stage determines social welfare for the period.
L e tu sd e n o t ei tb yW(x1,x 2). If we let expected consumers’ surplus under
(y1,y 2)=( x1,x 2)b eS(x1,x 2), we have
W(x1,x 2)=S(x1,x 2)+π1(x1,x 2)+π2(x1,x 2) − c(x1) − c(x2). (1)
One establishes the existence of a maximizer (xo
1,x o
2) to (1) under the usual
assumptions. We call this maximizer the second-best investment pair. The wel-
fare level that corresponds to (xo
1,x o
2) results from product-market competition,
which is imperfect and yields a price that is, in general, not equal to marginal
cost; this is the reason we call (xo
1,x o
2) the ‘second best’. We also deﬁne the
third best investment level x∗ as the one for which (x∗,0) maximizes (1) over
all (x,0)’s. Since the investment of one ﬁrm is constrained to equal zero un-
der the third best, the welfare level associated with the third best is lower (in
general) than the second best welfare level.
2.2 Examples
Now we present three parametric examples of period games that satisfy all
our assumptions. The cost of investment in all three examples is quadratic,
c(x)=x2, and the variable manufacturing cost is 0.3
3These examples contain parameters, and the values of these parameters determine what
type of equilibria arise in the dynamic game that we introduce later (see Section 4). The
parameters can also be used to determine how equilibria vary with these parameters.
6Example 1 (Cournot with heterogeneous consumers) There is a con-
tinuum of consumers, uniformly distributed on the interval [0,a]w i t hd e n s i t y
1. A consumer at t ∈ [0,a] is referred to as a type t consumer. Each consumer
buys zero or one unit, and the gross utility that a type t consumer derives from
one unit of quality q product is t + q. If the consumer buys this product and
pays p for it, her net utility is t + q − p.I fac o n s u m e r( o fa n yt y p e )d o e sn o t
buy, her net utility is zero. Hence a type-t consumer buys a product of expected
quality q only if p ≤ t + q. If a consumer (of any type) has a choice between
two products (q1,p 1)a n d( q2,p 2), she chooses the one with the higher qi − pi
as long as that product gives her a positive surplus; otherwise she does not buy
anything.
Let us ﬁx the investment vector (x1,x 2) and analyze the Cournot game
between ﬁrms. In this example, ﬁrm i’s action zi is quantity to sell and the
cost of producing this quantity is 0 (it can be any constant independent of
(x1,x 2)). Given the quantity vector (z1,z 2), together with a belief (y1,y 2), the
prices of the two ﬁrms are determined so that the market clears. Namely, all
consumers who are willing to buy at these prices are served, and both ﬁrms get
rid of the supplies they oﬀer. If both ﬁrms sell positive quantities, this means
consumers are indiﬀerent between buying the product of ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2. The
market-clearing prices that have these properties are
pi = a − Z + yi (2)
for i =1 ,2, where Z = z1 + z2. Since the marginal cost of production is zero,
we obtain, from (2), the following second stage payoﬀ functions
ui(z1,z 2;y1,y 2)=zi(a − Z + yi), i =1 ,2.
Given these payoﬀ functions one veriﬁes that Assumptions 1(i)-(ii) are satisﬁed.
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which, as required, is continuous in (y1,y 2). Moreover, using (3) one veriﬁes
that the proﬁtd i ﬀerential is
∆(x)=
½ 2








> 0 > lim
x→∞∆0(x),
which imply that Assumption 1(iii) is also satisﬁed. Indeed, x = a in this
example.
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Since c(x)=x2, social welfare net of investments in quality is
W(x1,x 2)=
8a2 +8 a(x1 + x2)+1 1 x2







8a2 +( x1 + x2)[8a − 7(x1 + x2)]
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. (5)








is a second best investment pair. In particular, (4a
7 ,0) is a second best pair and,
thus, x∗ = 4a
7 is the third best. In this example, therefore, the third best social
welfare coincides with the second best level.
Example 2 (Bertrand with homogenous consumers) In this example,
there is a continuum of identical consumers whose measure is a. Again, they
have unit demands, and the gross beneﬁt to a consumer who buys one unit of a
quality-q product is q. If the consumer pays p for this product her net beneﬁt
is q −p. Thus, if a consumer buys from a ﬁrm which is believed to have chosen
investment y and if the consumer pays price p, the consumer’s expected net
beneﬁti sy − p. If a consumer buys nothing she gets zero net beneﬁt.
In this game ﬁrms compete in prices at the second stage, so zi denotes
ﬁrm i’s price. Variable costs continue to be zero. Given a price vector (z1,z 2)
and a belief (y1,y 2), all consumers buy from the ﬁrm that gives them a higher
consumer’s surplus, i.e., they choose the i for which yi − zi is maximal and
non-negative (otherwise they don’t buy). If y1 − z1 = y2 − z2 ≥ 0a n dyi >y j,
consumers buy from ﬁrm i;i fy1 = y2, z1 = z2,a n dyi−zi ≥ 0, consumers divide
equally between ﬁrms. Since variable costs are zero, the game Γ(y1,y 2) is similar
to the Bertrand game with diﬀerent quality levels and, in its equilibrium, a ﬁrm
that is believed to provide the higher quality product makes sales, while its
8competitor makes no sales. As a result, if it is believed that yi >y j,t h e nﬁrm i
serves the whole market at the price yi −yj, and we have πi(y1,y 2)=a(yi −yj)
and πj(y1,y 2)=0 . C l e a r l yπi(y1,y 2)’s are continuous. Moreover, the proﬁt
diﬀerential is
∆(x)=ax − x2 = x(a − x),
which is concave and
∆0(0) = a>0 > ∆0(∞),
so Assumption 1 is again satisﬁed.
Concerning welfare, the social welfare function in this example is
W(x1,x 2)=amax{x1,x 2} − c(x1) − c(x2).
This function is maximized if one of the xi’s is chosen to equal zero, while the
other is chosen to satisfy c0(x∗) = 1. This gives x∗ = a/2 for the quadratic cost
case. Furthermore, in this example if ﬁrm i chooses xi > 0a n dﬁrm j chooses
xj = 0 and if consumers’ belief is correct, then ﬁrm i fully extracts consumers’
surplus. But, then, ﬁrm i’s objective coincides with the social objective, so
there is no distortion in the second stage. Hence, the third best in this example
coincides with the ﬁrst best.
Example 3 (Bertrand with heterogeneous consumers) One curious fea-
ture of the previous example is that in its equilibrium one ﬁrm makes all the
sales, while the other ﬁrm sells zero. This feature is due to the assumption
of homogeneous consumers. The present example assumes heterogeneous con-
sumers, so that the equilibrium has the more realistic feature that both ﬁrms
make positive sales.
There is again a continuum of consumers whose measure is 1, but they are not
identical. Instead, consumers are uniformly distributed on [0,1] and are indexed
by t.A t y p e t consumer derives gross utility tq from one unit of a quality-q
product, and net utility of tq −p if she pays p for this product. Consumers buy
at most one unit and choose the product that gives them a higher consumer’s
surplus, provided this surplus is non-negative (otherwise they don’t buy). The
minimum quality that a ﬁrm supplies is a ≥ 0, so that if 0 ≤ x ≤ a, the resulting
average quality is a and if x>a , the resulting average quality is x.T h e c o s t
of investing x is c(x)=( x − a)2. Therefore, it is wasteful for a ﬁrm to choose
x ∈ [0,a).
In this example there is a unique equilibrium in which the highest types
buy the high quality product, lower types buy the low quality product and the









9and equilibrium payoﬀsa r e
π1(y1,y 2)=4 y1
y1(y1 − y2)
(4y1 − y2)2, π2(y1,y 2)=y2
y1(y1 − y2)
(4y1 − y2)2 .( 6 )
As equation (6) shows, the πi(y1,y 2)’s are continuous in (y1,y 2). Furthermore,
(6) shows that equilibrium proﬁts and quantities of both ﬁrms are positive as
long as y2 > 0, which holds if a>0. Regarding the proﬁtd i ﬀerential we have




− (x − a)
¸
.
∆ is therefore single peaked and positive over x ≥ a if and only if
a ≤ x<x ≡
5a +1+
√
9a2 +1 0 a +1
8
.
So Assumption 1 is satisﬁed here too.




(4x − a)2 − (x − a)2.
This function is single peaked over x ≥ a and has a unique maximizer x∗.
Before concluding this subsection, let us note that if the period game de-
scribed in subsection 2.1 is played just once, then ﬁrms are subject to the usual
moral hazard problem, i.e., the unique equilibrium is for ﬁrms to invest 0. In-
deed, suppose that (x1,x 2) is an equilibrium investment pair of the static (two
stage) game. Then (y1,y 2)=( x1,x 2) is the only consistent belief given such an
equilibrium. As a result, ﬁrm i earns the gross proﬁto fπi(x1,x 2), regardless of
how much it invests in quality. Given that, ﬁrms optimally choose to invest 0.
Thus (0,0) is the only equilibrium investment proﬁle. Therefore, in a static play
ﬁrms do not invest in quality. In the next section we show that this conclusion
is no longer true in a dynamic play: we identify conditions under which ﬁrms do
invest in equilibrium, and conditions under which the equilibrium implements,
in fact, the third best eﬃcient outcome (which, as we saw in the examples, is
sometimes the second best or even the ﬁrst best).
2.3 The Repeated Game
T h ep e r i o dg a m es p e c i ﬁed in subsection 2.1 is played every period, t =1 ,2,...
Firms and consumers observe all realized qualities and ﬁrms observe their own
investments and actions in the past. They evaluate the stream of per-period
payoﬀs according to the long run weighted average of these period payoﬀs, where
the weight on proﬁts received at t is (1 − δ)δ
t−1, δ ∈ (0,1) being the common
discount factor. That is, the long run payoﬀ to a ﬁrm from the stream of (short
run) period payoﬀ (πt)∞
t=1 is






We focus on certain sequential equilibria of the repeated game that we call
turnover equilibria. A turnover equilibrium has the feature that one ﬁrm is
b e l i e v e dt oi n v e s tm o r et h a nt h eo t h e rﬁrm in quality. If the quality this ﬁrm
delivers is above some threshold level, this belief is maintained into the next
period. Otherwise, consumers are ‘disappointed’ and their belief is turned over,
i.e., they start believing that the other ﬁrm is the one that invests more in
quality.
More precisely, a turnover equilibrium is characterized by a pair (xH,q), the
outcome of which is as follows. In each period, one ﬁrm is believed to invest
xH in product quality. We call this ﬁrm the high quality ﬁrm,o r ,i ns h o r t ,t h e
HQ ﬁrm of that period. The other ﬁrm is called the low quality ﬁrm,o r ,i n
short, the LQ ﬁrm, and it is believed to invest 0. In each period, the HQ ﬁrm
optimally chooses xH, while the LQ ﬁrm optimally chooses 0 (the optimality of
these choices is veriﬁed later). Given consumers’ belief (which is either (xH,0) or
(0,x H), depending on which ﬁrm is HQ), the market clears in the way described
in subsection 2.1. As discussed earlier, market clearing is independent of ﬁrms’
actual investments in quality, so that if HQ deviates from xH this has no eﬀect
on market clearing.
The rule that speciﬁes who is the HQ ﬁrm in each period is as follows. The
HQ ﬁrm of period 1 is ﬁrm 1.4 Let a period t>1a n dt h eH Qﬁrm of period
t−1 be given. If the realized quality of the HQ ﬁrm in period t−1 was above q,
this ﬁrm continues to be the HQ ﬁrm of period t. Otherwise, turnover occurs,
and it becomes the LQ ﬁrm of period t,a n dt h eﬁrm that was the LQ ﬁrm
of period t − 1 becomes the HQ ﬁrm of period t. We refer to q as consumers’
tolerance level. Note that the realized quality of the LQ ﬁrm has no inﬂuence
on the occurrence of turnover.
Next we determine the conditions required to make the strategy proﬁle cor-
responding to the above description a sequential equilibrium of the repeated
game. Let vH and vL be the average long run payoﬀs of HQ and LQ, respec-
tively, given (xH,q) and given the discount factor δ. Since turnover occurs with
probability F(q − xH), these payoﬀs are determined by the following equations
vH =( 1− δ)πH + δ[F(q − xH)vL +( 1− F(q − xH))vH]( 7 )
vL =( 1− δ)πL + δ[F(q − xH)vH +( 1− F(q − xH))vL], (8)
where πH ≡ π1(xH,0) − c(xH)a n dπL ≡ π1(0,x H).
F r o m( 7 )a n d( 8 )w eg e t
vH − vL =
(1 − δ)∆(xH)
1 − δ[1 − 2F(q − xH)]
. (9)
4That, obviously, is an arbitrary speciﬁcation; a ‘twin’ equilibrium exists whereby ﬁrm 2
is the HQ ﬁrm of period 1.
11Since turnover is independent of the realized quality of LQ, there is no in-
centive constraint for LQ: it is just optimal for LQ to choose its static best
response; namely, 0. The only incentive constraint is for HQ: it must be in
HQ’s best interest to choose xH. So let us study the best response problem
facing HQ. Assume HQ faces the belief y. Its choice of x has no eﬀect on y and,
hence, has no eﬀect on HQ’s gross period payoﬀ,w h i c hi sπ1(y,0). The only
eﬀect that x h a si so nt h ec o s tc(x) and on the turnover probability F(q − x).
Consequently, the objective of HQ is
(1 − δ)[π1(y,0) − c(x)] + δ[F(q − x)vL +( 1− F(q − x))vH].
After some rearrangement and substitution from (9), HQ’s objective is to max-
imize
−(1 − δ)c(x) − δF(q − x)
(1 − δ)∆(y)
1 − δ[1 − 2F(q − y)]
+( 1− δ)π1(y,0) + δvH (10)




1 − δ[1 − 2F(q − y)]
=0 . (11)
Let R(y) be the set of solutions (possibly empty or multi valued) to (11). Our
ﬁrst result states a condition under which there is a unique solution to (11),
which is in fact the maximizer to (10). Furthermore, the condition guarantees
that this solution is continuous in y.
Lemma: Assume q<0a n dy<x,w h e r ex is deﬁned in Assumption 1.
Then R(y) is a singleton, and is the maximizer of (10). Furthermore, R(y)i s
continuous in y.
Proof. Since f0(q − x) > 0f o rq<0a n d∆(y) ≥ 0f o ry<x, q<0a n d
y<x guarantee that HQ’s objective is strictly concave over x ≥ 0. Hence R(y)
characterizes a unique maximizer of (10). Furthermore, since c0(∞)=∞,t h e
optimal x can be no larger than some e x<∞. Therefore, the theorem of the
maximum applies, and the result follows.
From this point onward we limit attention to q<0a n dy<x,i no r d e rt o
take advantage of the ﬁrst-order approach and the continuity of R.
A turnover equilibrium is deﬁned now by the ﬁxed point requirement that
R(xH)=xH or, equivalently, (xH,q)i saturnover equilibrium if xH is a solution
to
h(x) ≡− c0(x)+δf(q − x)
∆(x)
1 − δ[1 − 2F(q − x)]
=0 . (12)
We also say that xH is a turnover equilibrium under q if (xH,q)i sat u r n o v e r
equilibrium. In subsequent sections we study the existence of a turnover equi-









Figure 1: Two best response curves for Example 2 when f(²)=1
2e² for ²<0,
δ =0 .9, q = −1a n da =1 0 , 20
4E x i s t e n c e
In this section we prove the existence of a turnover equilibrium, which is equiv-
alent to the existence of a solution to (12) or a ﬁxed point to R(x)=x.T o
start with, let us note that a trivial turnover equilibrium exists for any ﬁxed
tolerance level q; namely, (0,q). Consumers’ belief in this equilibrium is so low
(i.e., y =0 )t h a tﬁrms invest x = 0 in quality - irrespective of consumers’ tol-
erance level. The outcome of this equilibrium is an indeﬁnite repetition of the
static equilibrium of the period game.
4.1 General Results
Obviously, we are interested in ensuring the existence of more eﬃcient equilibria,
i.e., equilibria with xH > 0. To illustrate what it takes to ensure that such
equilibria exist, we depict two best response curves R, for Example 2 under two
diﬀerent parameterizations. This is shown in Figure 1, where both curves are
drawn for example 2 under f(²)=1
2e² for ²<0, δ =0 .9, q = −1. One curve -
the low one - is drawn for low demand, i.e., it speciﬁes a = 10 and, consequently,
it lies everywhere below the 450 line, except at y = 0. The other curve is drawn
for high demand, i.e., it speciﬁes a = 20 and, consequently, it rises above the
450 line for small y’s. Both curves are hump shaped, and lie below the 450 line
for large y’s.
Comparing the two curves, we see that the low demand curve intersects the
450 l i n eo n l yo n c ea ty = 0 and yields only the trivial equilibrium, whereas the
high demand curve intersects the 450 line also at a positive y, so it yields a
nontrivial equilibrium. The conclusion we draw from this is that to ensure the
existence of a nontrivial equilibrium it suﬃces to ensure that R is steep enough
13at y = 0, and one way to ensure that is to require that demand is suﬃciently
high.
An analogous way to ensure the existence of a nontrivial equilibrium, which
is the approach we take in Proposition 1, is to require that the investment cost
function is suﬃciently low (at least for small investments). Then the incentive to
invest is strong, which produces the same eﬀect, i.e., it makes the best response
curve steep at y = 0. More precisely, we invoke the following assumption:
Assumption 2 c00(0) = 0.
A natural family of cost functions that satisfy Assumption 2 is c(x)=kxα
for α > 2a n da n yk>0. If α ≤ 2, this assumption is obviously not satisﬁed,
but we can still ensure the existence of an equilibrium by requiring k to be small
enough. This again will have the eﬀect of making R have a slope greater than
1a ty = 0, which is all that one needs to get a nontrivial equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then, for any q<0 and δ ∈
(0,1),
(i) an xH > 0 exists so that (xH,q) is a turnover equilibrium under δ,a n d
(ii) the set of all xH’s such that (xH,q) is a turnover equilibrium is compact.
Proof. As stated above, we want to show that there is a positive x for which
R(x)=x.L e tu sﬁrst observe that, since ∆(x)=0 ,w eh a v e0=R(x) < x.
Invoking Assumptions 1 and 2 together with ∆(0) = 0, we also have that
h0 (0) = δf(q)
∆0(0)
1 − δ[1 − 2F(q)]
> 0.
Hence, there exists an x1 > 0s u c ht h a th(x1) > 0. (12) shows that h(x1) > 0
implies R(x1) >x 1. Therefore, since R(x1) >x 1 and R(x) < x, and since R is
continuous, there exists an xH,0 <x 1 <x H < x,s ot h a tR(xH)=xH. Hence
(i) is proven.
Since R is continuous, the set of its ﬁxed points is closed. The above argu-
ment shows that any ﬁxed point xH must satisfy xH < x<∞, i.e., the set of
ﬁxed points is bounded. This proves (ii).
Note that Proposition 1 places no restrictions on δ.A sl o n ga sc00(0) = 0 and
q<0 the existence of a nontrivial turnover equilibrium is guaranteed no matter
how small δ is. This is not to say that the equilibrium xH does not depend on
δ; it certainly does. However, the mere existence of a nontrivial equilibrium is
independent of the value of δ.
Since the equilibrium xH i nt h ea b o v ep r o o fi sg e n e r a t e da saﬁxed point of
a continuous function and since a continuous function may have more than one
ﬁxed point, the nontrivial equilibrium under a ﬁxed q need not be unique. Figure
141 shows, however, that the nontrivial equilibrium is unique in some examples,
and the next result generalizes this observation. To prove this result we need
an extra assumption, which is
Assumption 3
∆(x)
c0(x) is decreasing in x.
Suppose the investment cost in Examples 1, 2 and 3, which we speciﬁed in
subsection 2.2, is cubic rather that quadratic, c(x)=x3 (with c(x)=( x−a)3 in
E x a m p l e3 ) .T h e n ,a l lt h r e ee x a m p l e ss atisfy Assumptions 2 and 3 under this
cost speciﬁcation. This shows that the next result holds non-vacuously.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Then, for any q<0,t h e r e
exists a δ such that for any δ ≤ δ, the nontrivial turnover equilibrium under q
is unique.
Proof. Fix some q<0a n dδ ∈ (0,1). Then, by Assumption 2 and Propo-
sition 1, we know that a nontrivial turnover equilibrium exists. So let x>0
be such an equilibrium. Then it must satisfy the ﬁxed point requirement (12),
w h i c hi sr e w r i t t e na s
1=δ
f(q − x)




Let us evaluate the derivative of the RHS of (13) at this x.D i ﬀerentiating the












1 − δ[1 − 2F(q − x)]
. (14)
Since q<0i sﬁxed, both f(q − x)a n df0(q − x) are continuous and bounded
away from 0 for x ∈ [0,x], which implies that γ ≡ minx∈[0,x]
f0(q−x)
f(q−x) > 0. Also,





∆(x) is well deﬁned and




1−δ . Putting these three facts together we conclude that





Let δ be such that (15) is negative for all δ ≤ δ. Then, the function on the
RHS of (13) is negatively sloped at any point at which it crosses the horizontal
line with height equal to 1. This implies there can be at most one such crossing
point, i.e., the equilibrium is unique.
The analysis, therefore, shows that the multiplicity of turnover equilibria for
a ﬁxed q is possible, under Assumptions 2 and 3, only for a large δ.T h i s i s
analogous to Folk-Theorem-type results, where the multiplicity of equilibria is
shown for large δ’s, but not (necessarily) for small δ’s. One major diﬀerence,
however, is that for any δ, whether it is small or not, we have a nontrivial
turnover equilibrium with a positive investment level.
154.2 Numerical Illustration of the Dynamic
As described earlier, turnover equilibria are characterized by the turnover of
consumers’ belief. In addition, they exhibit the turnover of more tangible vari-
ables such as prices and quantities. Consider, in particular, the three examples
introduced in subsection 2.2. Then, when a ﬁrm loses its HQ status and becomes
LQ, the average quality of its products deteriorates, it loses market share, it re-
ceives a lower price, it earns lower period proﬁt, and its stock market valuation
goes down. Therefore, the well being of ﬁr m si ss u b j e c tt oﬂuctuations; a ﬁrm
gets large period proﬁts for a while, then it gets small proﬁts, only to eventually
return to its large proﬁt state. In this subsection we numerically illustrate the
ﬂuctuations that a turnover equilibrium induces. We do this by selecting one
particular example and assigning numerical values to its parameters. Then, we
solve for the nontrivial equilibrium of this example, and compute the values of
various endogenous variables that are associated with this equilibrium.
To be speciﬁcw ea d o p tt h ef o l l o w i n gp r o c e d u r e . G i v e ns o m eq and δ we
determine the equilibrium investment level xH from equation (12). Then, we
compute the turnover probability, F = F(q −xH), the duration of being in the
HQ (and the LQ) state, T = 1
F ,t h ep e r i o dp r o ﬁto fH Qa n dL Q ,πH and πL,
and the corresponding average long run proﬁt, vH and vL. Also, since there are
multiple equilibria, depending on which q is the equilibrium tolerance level, we
illustrate our results for 2 diﬀerent q values. Relatedly, we illustrate our results
for 2 diﬀerent discount factors. All these computations are done for Example 1
with cubic cost, a = 20, and f(²)=1
2e² for ²<0. We report the results in the
following table.
(0.9,−1) (0.95,−1) (0.9,−2) (0.95,−2)
x 1.101 1.340 0.770 1.016
F 0.061 0.048 0.031 0.024
T 16.342 20.773 31.927 40.843
πH 53.433 54.750 51.098 52.890
πL 39.687 38.686 41.087 40.041
vH 49.831 49.557 49.293 49.794
vL 43.289 43.879 42.892 43.137
Table 1: The values of various endogenous variables for 4 parameter
conﬁgurations.
As this table shows, equilibrium investments increase in δ and q. The next
section provides an analytical counterpart to these numerical results, giving
conditions under which these results hold in general.
5 Comparative Statics
This section studies the comparative static properties of turnover equilibria.
Our approach here bears some resemblance to the literature on monotone com-
parative statics; see Milgrom and Roberts (1990). In particular, we show that
16changes in certain parameters shift the best response curve R upwards at all
points of its domain, which makes the largest equilibrium shift upwards as well.
Note, however, that R itself is not upward sloping and the underlying game is
not supermodular. Nonetheless, it is still possible to prove and take advantage
of the property that the best response curve shifts uniformly in our setting.
To pursue this approach we assume that a nontrivial turnover equilibrium
exists, and that the set of equilibria is compact. Proposition 1 provides a set
of suﬃcient conditions to ensure that. Given this assumption, we know that a
largest turnover equilibrium exists for any pair (δ,q). We denote this turnover
equilibrium by x(δ,q), and prove comparative statics results with respect to
this equilibrium. Since our approach is to show that changes in parameters
shift R,w em a k et h ed e p e n d e n c eo fR on (δ,q) explicit in this section and write
R(y;δ,q).
5.1 Patience
We start by studying the eﬀect of ﬁrms’ patience parameter δ on the equilibrium
investment in quality. The following result conforms with the usual intuition
that more patient ﬁrms try harder to keep a good reputation, which they do by
investing more in quality.
Proposition 3 Fix a q<0.T h e nx(δ,q) is increasing in δ.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that R(y;δ,q)i si n c r e a s i n gi nδ for (arbitrarily) ﬁxed y
and q<0. In other words, we show that for any δ ∈ (0,1) and δ
0 > δ,
R(y;δ
0,q) ≥ R(y;δ,q). (16)
Let x = R(y;δ,q). Then (16) immediately follows if x = 0, so let us assume
otherwise. Then (11) implies that
−c0(x)+δf(q − x)
∆(y)
1 − δ[1 − 2F(q − y)]
=0 . (17)
One readily veriﬁes that the LHS of (17) is increasing in δ (note that (17)





0[1 − 2F(q − y)]
≥ 0, (18)
since δ
0 > δ. Since HQ’s objective is concave, (18) implies that R(y;δ
0,q) ≥ x =
R(y;δ,q).
Specializing this to y = x(δ,q), we get
R(x(δ,q);δ
0,q) ≥ R(x(δ,q);δ,q)=x(δ,q),
where the last equality follows from the deﬁnition of x(δ,q). Since R(x;δ
0,q)=0





Next, we determine how x(δ,q) varies with q. The question we ask is whether
less tolerant consumers, a larger q, encourage or discourage the HQ ﬁrm to
invest more in quality.
The eﬀect of an increase in q is not as clear cut as the eﬀect of an increase
in δ.A ni n c r e a s ei nq either raises or lowers the marginal return to investment,
δf(q−x)
∆(y)
1−δ[1−2F(q−y)], and, therefore, either raises or lowers the best response
curve, R. This depends on which of two opposing eﬀects dominates. The ﬁrst
eﬀect is that an increase in q increases the marginal probability f(q −x)t h a ta
turnover is averted, and this increases the marginal return to investment. The
second eﬀect is that an increase in q increases the rate of turnover in the industry,
F(q −x). This decreases the payoﬀ from averting turnover and, thus, decreases
the marginal return to investment. In general either eﬀect maybe stronger than
the other, depending on model primitives. Given this, our approach here is to
elicit suﬃcient conditions under which one eﬀect dominates the other, so that
the overall eﬀect of a change in q has a deﬁnitive sign.





which partially summarizes the two eﬀects discussed above.5
Our ﬁr s tr e s u l th e r ei st h a ti fH is increasing, then investments increase in
q. We state the condition and the result as follows.
Assumption 4 For any ²<0,
H0(²) ≥ 0.
Since H is the derivative of logF, Assumption 4 is equivalent to logconvexity
of F.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 4 holds. Then for any δ, x(δ,q) is in-
creasing in q on (−∞,0).
Proof. Fix some δ ∈ (0,1) and q1 <q 2 < 0, and let x1 = x(q1,δ), x2 = x(q2,δ).










q1 − x1¢¤ =0 . (19)
5Although they are not formally used in our proofs, two interpretations of H may help
explain its role. The ﬁrst interpretation is that H is the long run return to an increase in
investments, assuming consumers follow cutoﬀ rules. The second interpretation is that H is
the probability that a small increase in investment averts turnover - conditional on the event
that turnover is about to occur.





























q2 − x1¢¤ ≥ 0.
Consequently, R(x1;δ,q2) ≥ x1. Therefore, as in the proof of Proposition 3,
there exists an xH ≥ x1 so that R(xH;δ,q2)=xH, which implies that x2 ≥
x1.
Examples of logconvex distributions include f(²)=1
2e² for ²<0, which is
the distribution underlying Figure 1 and the numerical illustration in subsection
4.2. Then, logF(²)=² ( u pt oa na d d i t i v ec o n s t a n t ) , which is indeed (weakly)
convex. More generally, consider the family of functions
F (²)=
½ 1
2 exp[−g(−²)] if ²<0
1 − 1
2 exp[−g(²)] if ² ≥ 0, (21)
where g :[ 0 ,∞) → R is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable function for which
g(0) = 0, g(∞)=∞,a n dg0(²) > 0 >g 00(²). Any member from this family
satisﬁes
H0(²)=−g00 (−²) > 0.
for any ²<0. Another example of a member from this family is constructed by
letting g(²)=l o g ( ² +1 ) .
We next consider the case where H is decreasing, i.e., the case of a logconcave
F. For this case we prove a partial converse to Proposition 4. It is a converse
because we prove that investments decrease rather than increase in q.I t i s
partial because we have to impose one extra restriction, namely, that ﬁrms are
suﬃciently patient.
The proof of Proposition 4 makes clear why an extra restriction is needed.
Indeed, if we look at equation (20) we see - under logconcavity - that an increase
in q1 aﬀects 1−δ
f(q1−x1) and 2δ
H(q1−x1) in opposite directions (which is not the case
under logconvexity). However, if δ is suﬃciently large, the eﬀect on 2δ
H(q1−x1)
dominates, and investments decrease in q1. In proving our next result one follows
the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 4, except for the qualiﬁcation we
just mentioned. Consequently, we state the result and provide only a sketch of
the proof.
19Assumption 5 For any ²<0,
H0(²) < 0. (22)
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumption 5 holds. Then, for any M>0,t h e r e
exists a δ so that for any δ ≥ δ, x(δ,q) is decreasing in q on (−M,0).
Sketch of the Proof. Since the interval [−M,0] is compact for any ﬁxed






is increasing in ² on [−M,0] for any δ ≥ δ. N o wt h er e s u l tf o l l o w s ,i fw eﬁx
δ ≥ δ and q’s on (−M,0) and apply the same argument employed in the proof
of Proposition 4.
In analogy with logconvexity, Assumption 5 is satisﬁed for distributions of
the form given in (21), except that g is required to be convex rather than
concave, and that it satisﬁes
(g0(²))2 − g00(²) > 0. (23)
(23) is necessary to ensure that f0(²) > 0f o r²<0. Concrete examples in-
clude g(²)=e x p ( ²) − 1. We also note that many textbook examples have a
logconcave c.d.f; this includes the normal and the extreme value distribution,
F (²)=e x p[ −exp(−β²)], where β > 0.
6W e l f a r e
We conclude our analysis by characterizing a set of investment levels that can







H (q − x)∆(x) > 2c0 (x) > inf
q<0
H (q − x)∆(x)
¾
. (24)
Then for any x ∈ X∗,t h e r ee x i s t saδ such that for any δ ≥ δ,t h e r ee x i s t saq
so that (x,q) is a turnover equilibrium.
Proof. Fix some x ∈ X∗. Then, by (24), there exist q0,q00 < 0s ot h a t
H (q0 − x)∆(x) > 2c0 (x) >H(q00 − x)∆(x).
Therefore, there exists a δ, so that for any δ ≥ δ,
δf (q0 − x)
1 − δ [1 − 2F (q0 − x)]
∆(x) >c 0 (x) >
δf (q00 − x)
1 − δ [1 − 2F (q00 − x)]
∆(x). (25)
20(25) implies that for any δ ≥ δ, there exists a q<0 such that
c0 (x)=
δf (q − x)∆(x)
1 − δ[1 − 2F (q − x)]
,
which is (12). Hence, x is a turnover equilibrium under q and δ.
Proposition 6 delineates a set of investment levels and, therefore, a set of
welfare levels that are asymptotically (as δ → 1) sustainable via turnover equi-
libria. In particular, if x∗ ∈ X∗, then some turnover equilibrium sustains the
third best investment level x∗, the socially optimal investment level of one ﬁrm
given that the other ﬁrm chooses zero. Remember that the LQ ﬁrm invests zero
in any turnover equilibrium, so this is the best outcome we can hope for from
the turnover mechanism. One implication of Proposition 6 is that if x∗ / ∈ X∗,
then eﬃciency or even constrained eﬃciency is not attainable - even if we let
δ → 1. This implication is analogous to results reported in Radner et al. (1986),
except that they analyze a partnership game.
Let us numerically illustrate the possibility of implementing x∗ by calculating
a restriction on parameter values that ensures it. Let us consider Example 1.
Then ∆(x)=
2x(a−x)
3 ,c(x)=x2 and x∗ = 4a
7 . Let us also assume logconcavity
(Assumption 5 or (22)). Therefore, if x∗ is implementable, the RHS of (24) says
we must have
4x∗ >H(−x∗)
2x∗ (a − x∗)
3
, (26)










Now, if we specify F, we can pin down a closed-form restriction on a.F o r









which holds if and only if a<2.81. Furthermore, since limx→−∞ H(x)=∞,
the LHS of (24) is automatically satisﬁed, so a<2.81 is suﬃcient to ensure











which holds if and only if a<3.5. Again, since limx→−∞ H(x)=∞,t h i s
condition is also suﬃcient.
Equation (24) helps us better understand the idea that noise in the observa-
tion of behavior acts as an obstacle to achieving eﬃciency. For example, suppose
21F is normally distributed: f(x)= 1 √
2πσe
− x2
2σ2 ,w h e r eσ is its variance. Since F
is logconcave, it is easily seen that
sup
q<0






H (q − x)=0 .










which is decreasing in σ. Hence, to the extent that x∗ is close to zero, a smaller
σ makes x∗ ∈ X∗ more likely to happen. In this way, our analysis suggests that
the smaller the noise is, the more likely it is that x∗ is implementable.
As stated earlier, Proposition 6 delineates a set of investment levels that
are implementable via turnover equilibria. A bigger set is potentially imple-
mentable if one allows for arbitrary strategies, including those that depend in
complex ways on history. Such strategies might be too complicated for con-
sumers to carry out, however, so it is interesting to determine whether a simple
generalization of turnover implements a bigger set of investments. Speciﬁcally,
let us consider the strategy whereby the realized quality diﬀerence between the
two ﬁrms determines turnover. This generalized mechanism ‘pitches’ one ﬁrm
against the other, so we refer to it as a ‘tournament’ mechanism. To be con-
crete, let xL and xH be the investments of LQ and HQ, and let qL and qH be
their realized qualities. Deﬁne a tournament mechanism by the property that
turnover occurs if and only if qH −qL < q for some q.6 T h eq u e s t i o nw ea d d r e s s
now is whether equilibria under the tournament mechanism implement a posi-
tive investment by LQ and, if so, whether these equilibria improve social welfare
- compared with turnover equilibria. Our last result provides a negative answer
to these questions and, thereby, provides a partial justiﬁcation for focusing on
the turnover mechanism.
Proposition 7 Assume xL > 0 and xH > 0.T h e n t h e r e e x i s t s n o q so that
(xL,x H,q) is a tournament equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a q under which (xH,x L)
is a tournament equilibrium. Let b G be the c.d.f. of ²1 − ²2 and let b g be the
corresponding p.d.f. By symmetry, b G is also the c.d.f. of ²2 − ²1.T h u s ,g i v e n
(xH,x L), turnover occurs with probability b G(q − xH + xL)i ne a c hp e r i o do n
the equilibrium path.
For this equilibrium, we have the following value equations:
vH =( 1− δ)πH + δ[b G(q − xH + xL)vL +( 1− b G(q − xH + xL))vH] (29)
6Note that if q<0, then the LQ ﬁrm is ‘handicapped’, i.e., it has to deliver a quality which
is suﬃciently higher, not simply marginally higher, to earn the HQ status.
22vL =( 1− δ)πL + δ[b G(q − xH + xL)vH +( 1− b G(q − xH + xL))vL], (30)
where πH = π1(xH,x L) − c(xH)a n dπL = π2(xH,x L) − c(xL). Since xH > 0
and xL > 0, the following ﬁrst-order conditions must hold in equilibrium:
(1 − δ)c0(xH)=δb g(q − xH + xL)(vH − vL) (31)
(1 − δ)c0(xL)=δb g(q − xH + xL)(vH − vL) (32)
However, (31) and (32) imply xH = xL, which in turn implies vH = vL by (29)
and (30). Hence (31) and (32) reduce to
c0(xH)=c0(xL)=0 .
But this contradicts xH > 0a n dxL > 0.
7 Conclusion and Related Literature
This paper explores the hypothesis that consumers condition their beliefs and,
hence, their purchasing behavior on the past performance of ﬁrms they buy from.
This hypothesis implies that market shares, proﬁts and stock market valuations
ﬂuctuate over time. The hypothesis and its implications apply to a broad set
of markets, ranging from markets where the downside risk of experiencing low
quality is relatively small, such as restaurants or books, to markets where the
downside risk is catastrophic, such as airplane crashes or cars that tip over or
equipment that can be dangerous to operate. In closing let us mention some
empirical studies and cases that are consistent with our working hypothesis.
One such study is Mitchell (1989), who documents and analyses the poi-
soning of Tylenol capsules at the retail level, which took place some 20 years
ago. As he shows, Johnson and Johnson reacted by cutting the price of Tylenol
by 2.50 dollars (by distributing coupons) and, notwithstanding, lost signiﬁcant
market share and suﬀered signiﬁcant loss of stock market valuation. Simi-
larly, Chalk (1987) shows that the loss of stock market valuation of airlines in
the wake of fatal crashes comes from ‘market discipline,’ as opposed to reg-
ulatory and legal penalties. A recent case exhibiting similar features is the
Ford/Bridgestone/Firestone debacle, which occupied the popular press during
the summer of 2000. As reported in various publications, Bridgestone/Firestone
lost market share, which is evidenced by the fact that it ﬁred a signiﬁcant por-
tion of its labor force. While these catastrophic events receive a lot of pub-
licity, this phenomenon is certainly not limited to catastrophic losses. For in-
stance, Ippolito (1992) documents the reaction of investors to performance in
the mutual-fund industry, ﬁnding that poor relative performance results in in-
vestors shifting their assets to other funds. Recent events in the same industry
provide another illustration. Mutual funds that did well for their customers
during the 90’s, were later hit by low returns and corruption charges. Cus-
tomers lost faith in these companies, withdrew their funds, and moved them to
alternative investment channels.
23We also suggest several extensions and further relationship to the theoretical
literature on reputations. An important approach to reputation, that originated
in Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), stresses the role
of adverse selection. A ﬁrm invests in quality because high realized quality is
construed as (statistical) evidence that the ﬁrm is a good type. We have de-
emphasized this approach, focusing instead on a pure moral hazard formulation.
One obvious extension, then, is to view the incentive to invest in quality and
the consequent turnover through these (adverse selection) lens and explore their
implications.
There are many other extensions that are possible. Extensions that relate
to the way the model is set up, and that constitute robustness checks, include
oligopoly with more than two ﬁrms, entry and exit, more general noise struc-
tures, and more general turnover strategies. Extensions that relate to practical
aspects include the derivation of further predictions of the theory that are,
in principle, testable. For example, do proﬁts correlate with the frequency of
turnover or with prices and quantities (and how does that relate to ‘fundamen-
tals’)? Another possibility is to consider parametric examples in which high
quality does not necessarily mean high proﬁt. A high quality product may be
geared towards a niche market (e.g., an elite group of customers) and, as such,
may generate a high markup, but not high volume of sales and, therefore, not
high proﬁts. The interaction between quality, proﬁts and the incentive to build
reputation is then an open question. Finally there is the possibility of exploring
the disciplinary role of the legal system and how it interacts with market disci-
pline. Therefore, while our work provides an analytical framework and answers
some questions about the dynamics of reputation and turnover, many other
questions await further analysis.
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